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CHURCH-STATE CONFLICT UNDER THE
TEXAS CHILD CARE LICENSING ACT:
A TEN-YEAR HISTORY
by Terry Marcus Henry
HE Texas Child Care Licensing Act1 provides for the licensing and
regulations of child care facilities in Texas. Many churches and reli-
gious organizations provide child care ministries that fall within the
purview of the Act,2 giving rise to conflicts between the state and churches
over the licensure and control of religious child care facilities. Each conflict
that has progressed to appellate court litigation, including the recent case of
State v. Corpus Christi People's Baptist Church, Inc. ,3 has involved the child
care institutions associated with the late Lester Roloff of Corpus Christi. In
People's Baptist Church the Texas Supreme Court upheld the Child Care
Licensing Act over claims by the church that the Act violated the guarantees
of the religion clauses of the first amendment of the United States
Constitution.4
The Act has governed Texas child care for approximately ten years.5 A
review of the developments in the law during the last decade is necessary to
understanding whether the recent decision by the Texas Supreme Court fully
and properly addressed first amendment objections to the Act. This Com-
ment sets forth the various claims of religion clause violations asserted by
religious institutions against the Act and briefly reviews decisions of the
courts of appeal and supreme court in Texas concerning these allegations.
Finally, this Comment analyzes the present state of child care law in Texas.
I. THE CHILD CARE LICENSING ACT
The Texas Child Care Licensing Act arose out of a crisis in Texas child
care. 6 The crisis situation included allegations of and indictments for child
1. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 42.001-.076 (Vernon 1980).
2. See infra note 9; Esbeck, State Regulation of Social Service Ministries of Religious
Organizations, 16 VAL. U.L. REV. 1, 2 (1981) (list of typical church social service ministries).
3. 683 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. 1984), appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 32, 88 L. Ed. 2d 26 (1985).
4. 683 S.W.2d at 696-97. The first amendment to the U.S. Constitution states, in part,
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
5. The effective date of the Act was January 1, 1976. Child Care Licensing Act, ch. 708,
§ 27, 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 2240, 2250.
6. TEX. HOUSE COMM. ON HUM. REs., 63D LEG., REPORT ON THE INTERIM STUDY ON
CHILD-CARING IN TEXAS 7 (Nov. 12, 1974).
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abuse in private child care institutions. 7 Furthermore, child care agencies in
other states that had placed children in Texas facilities removed those chil-
dren in the midst of allegations of mistreatment of the children.8
The Act has the express purpose of promoting the health, safety, and wel-
fare of children in child care facilities throughout the state.9 To further that
goal it empowers the Texas Department of Human Resources (DHR) to
regulate and license child care facilities.' 0 As part of the mandate to the
DHR, the Act gives the DHR authority to promulgate and enforce rules and
minimum standards for child care facilities." The DHR has rulemaking
powers over the personal health and safety of children, physical facilities
used for children, staffing of facilities, food service to children, discrimatory
practices of facilities, and parent or guardian involvement in the child care
program.' 2 In addition to authorizing minimum standards, the Act itself
contains requirements for immunizations, inspections, and recordkeeping.' 3
Under the Act no person may operate a child care facility without a li-
cense.' 4 Moreover, a facility may obtain a license only by compliance with
the requirements of the Act, including the minimum standards of the
DHR. 15 Operation of a facility without a license or nonconformity with
minimum standards provides the state with grounds to close the facility' 6 as
well as grounds for civil and criminal penalties against the operator of the
facility. 17
In establishing this broad regulatory scheme for child care facilities, the
Texas Legislature expressly disclaimed any intent to encroach upon religious
freedoms guaranteed by the first amendment. The Act expressly denies the
DHR authority to regulate or become involved in the religious instruction or
7. Id. at 1-2.
8. Id. at 3.
9. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 42.001 (Vernon 1980). Child care facilities that are
subject to the requirements of the Act include, inter alia, foster homes, day care centers, and
institutional care facilities. Id. §§ 42.002, .041, .042. Facilities that are exempted from licens-
ing requirements of the Act include shopping center nurseries, church nurseries, Sunday
schools, church summer camps, and others. Id. § 42.041.
10. Id. § 42.021.
11. Id. § 42.042.
12. Id. § 42.042(e)(1)-(6).
13. Id. §§ 42.043, .044, .045.
14. Id. § 42.041.
15. See id. § 42.072, which provides for the denial of a license if a facility does not comply
with the requirements of the Act, the standards of the DHR, or specific terms of the license.
Section 42.049 of the Act states that a potential licensee must meet all requirements. Since the
Act does not specifically define "all requirements," the Corpus Christi People's Baptist
Church, Inc., challenged the Act as overly vague. See Brief for Corpus Christi People's Bap-
tist Church, Inc. at 16-20, State v. Corpus Christi People's Baptist Church, Inc., No. 10-83-
128-CV (Tex. App.-Waco 1982), rev'd, 683 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. 1984), appeal dismissed, 106 S.
Ct. 32, 88 L. Ed. 2d 26 (1985) (incorporated into Amended Answer for Corpus Christi Peo-
ple's Baptist Church, Inc., 683 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. 1984), appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 32, 88 L.
Ed. 2d 26 (1985)) [hereinafter cited as People's Baptist Brief]. Potential licensees may obtain a
waiver of specific minimum standards only if compliance is economically impractical. TEX.
HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 42.0420) (Vernon 1980).
16. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 42.073-.074 (Vernon 1980).
17. Id. §§ 42.075-.076.
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curriculum of a school sponsored by a religious organization.18 Unfortu-
nately, the legislature, in limiting its concern to encroachment into curricula,
failed to provide limits on encroachment into the constitutionally protected
religious freedoms of noncurricular operations and activities of child care
facilities that belong to religious organizations.1 9 Litigation based on
noncurricular encroachments under the Child Care Licensing Act has fo-
cused primarily on the first amendment's free exercise and establishment
clauses. 20
II. FIRST AMENDMENT OBJECTIONS TO THE CHILD CARE
LICENSING ACT
A. Religious Freedoms Under the First Amendment
The first amendment to the United States Constitution restricts govern-
ment involvement and interference with religious beliefs and practice.21 Us-
ing the bare text of the first amendment, the United States Supreme Court
has classified first amendment restrictions on federal and state governments
into two areas. First, the free exercise clause 22 of the first amendment abso-
lutely prohibits the government from inhibiting or regulating religious be-
lief.23 The clause also prohibits government interference with most religious
activity.24 Second, the establishment clause25 prevents state and federal gov-
18. Id. §§ 42.001, .042(k). The prohibition on DHR involvement in religious instruction
supplements the restriction on DHR authority to regulate church nurseries, Sunday schools,
and summer camps. See id. § 42.041.
19. See Esbeck, supra note 2, at 32.
20. E.g., State v. Corpus Christi People's Baptist Church, Inc., 683 S.W.2d 692, 696-97
(Tex. 1984), appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 32, 88 L. Ed. 2d 26 (1985); Oxford v. Hill, 558
S.W.2d 557, 559 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ refd); Roloff Evangelistic Enters. v.
State, 556 S.W.2d 856, 858 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.), appeal dismissed,
439 U.S. 803 (1978). Although at least one litigant has also challenged the Act on the basis of
the Texas Constitution (see People's Baptist Church, 683 S.W.2d at 697), the challenge was
unsuccessful. This Comment, therefore, limits consideration to federal issues.
21. For the relevant language of the first amendment, see supra note 4. The first amend-
ment promotes separation of church and state. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 219-20 (1963) (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952)). The Supreme
Court has, however, limited this philosophy in recent years. Under this limited view the first
amendment dictates a course of "benevolent neutrality" toward religion instead of absolute
separation of church and state. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
22. "Congress shall make no law.., prohibiting the free exercise [of religion] .... U.S.
CONsT. amend. I. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-05, 311 (1940), the Supreme
Court held that the free exercise clause applied to the states. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 813-14 (1978).
23. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940); Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
24. In order to justify interference with religious practice the government must demon-
strate a compelling interest that cannot be served by a less restrictive means. See infra notes
27-32 and accompanying text. Originally the Court interpreted the first amendment to prevent
only regulation of beliefs. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878). The Court
later abandoned this simple but inadequate test in favor of the compelling interest test first
enunciated in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-07 (1963). Bangor Baptist Church v.
Maine, 549 F. Supp. 1208, 1216 (D. Me. 1982); Drake, Attempted State Control of the Reli-
gious School: Congress Shall Make No Law Inhibiting the Free Exercise of Religion?, 7 OHIO
N.U.L. REV. 954, 958-59 (1980).
25. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion .... " U.S.
1986] 1051
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ernments from advancing, aiding, or establishing religion.26 The Court's de-
cisions have produced tests for determining government violation under
each of the religion clauses. Based upon the tests set forth by the Supreme
Court, religious opponents to the Child Care Licensing Act have raised ob-
jections under both religion clauses of the first amendment.
B. Free Exercise Objections to the Act
The United States Supreme Court has developed a multi-prong compel-
ling interest test to establish violations of the free exercise clause. 27 First, a
party claiming a free exercise clause violation must demonstrate that an in-
fringement of religious beliefs exists. The challenged state law, regulation,
or activity thus must burden conduct that is based upon truly held religious
beliefs. 28 Under this first prong of the compelling interest test a court may
not inquire into the veracity of a claimant's religious belief, but may inquire
into the sincerity of the belief.29 Once a claimant demonstrates an infringe-
ment of a first amendment right, then the state must justify the infringe-
ment.30 The state must have more than a general interest in regulation of
CONST. amend. I. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 13-16, 18 (1947), made the establish-
ment clause applicable to the states. L. TRIBE, supra note 22, at 813-14.
26. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
770-72 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 15 (1947). Arguably, the framers of the Constitution did not intend the establishment
clause to prevent aid to religion, but rather intended it to prevent the federal government from
supplanting the official religions of the several states with one federally established religion.
See L. TRIBE, supra note 22, at 818; Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on Governmental
Interference with Religious Organizations, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347, 362-63 (1984). Deci-
sions of the Supreme Court, however, have liberalized the definition of establishment to pre-
vent government aid to religion. See, e.g., Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 770-72; Lemon, 403 U.S. at
612; Everson, 330 U.S. at 15. For a critical analysis of this liberalized definition, see R. CORD,
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 223-39 (1982).
27. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-07 (1963); see Drake, supra note 24, at 958-59.
28. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713-16 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 215 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-05 (1963). The burden placed upon
religious conduct by state regulation must involve some element of coercion. See Thomas, 450
U.S. at 716-18; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404. A burden exists when compulsion is direct, such as
the imposition of a fine for engaging in religious conduct, as well as when the compulsion is
indirect, such as denial of benefits to those engaged in religious activity. See Thomas, 450 U.S.
at 717-18.
29. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944). Only beliefs based on religion
receive first amendment protection. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981). A belief
does not lose first amendment protection, however, solely because the entire religious sect does
not uniformly share the belief. Id. at 715-16; Esbeck, supra note 26, at 397-98; see United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982) (Court refused to examine whether Amish litigant's
belief was correct Amish belief). The free exercise clause, however, does not protect beliefs
based upon secular or philosophical grounds. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215
(1972). The possibility exists for a claim to be so "bizarre" and "clearly non-religious in moti-
vation" as not to merit constitutional protection. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715.
In actual litigation the government usually stipulates as to the sincerity of the claimant's
belief. CLA Seeks to Establish Sincerity of Beliefs in Court, THE BRIEFCASE, Sept. 1985, at 4
(Christian Law Association Newsletter). For a discussion of the "judicial gymnastics" often
involved when the state does not stipulate to the sincerity of the claimant's belief, see Shugrue,
An Approach to Mutual Respect. The Christian School Controversy, 18 CREIGHTON L. REV.
219, 232-35 (1985).
30. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-59 (1982); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450
U.S. 707, 718 (1981).
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the activity in question; only compelling interests or "interests of the highest
order" are sufficient to overcome an infringement upon the free exercise of
religion. 31 Finally, even if the state demonstrates a compelling interest, the
state must also prove that the challenged restrictions constitute the least re-
strictive means to achieving the state's compelling interest.32
Litigants have attacked the Child Care Licensing Act on the basis of the
compelling interest test.33 The licensing requirement of the Child Care Li-
censing Act is the primary subject of attack in litigation. Many churches
and religious institutions believe that their child care ministries originated
from Biblical instructions to aid and evangelize needy children and children
of Christian parents. 34 These organizations consider their child care activi-
ties to be an integral and inseparable part of their ministry.35 Thus, the
groups believe that subjecting part of the church's ministry to state approval
or censure violates the lordship of Christ over the church.36
The Act also requires that the DHR license the administrator of a child
care facility. 37 This licensing requirement may disqualify otherwise theolog-
ically qualified persons from the administrator position if those candidates
for the position do not meet state licensing requirements. 38 The licensing
requirement thus burdens the religious freedom of a church or religious or-
ganization by limiting the organization's choice and forcing the organization
to find an administrator who meets licensing requirements as well as theo-
logical criteria.39
31. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981). Compelling interests include
some threat to the "public health, safety, peace, or order," (Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
403 (1963)), such as interests in preventing polygamy (Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1878)), controlling child labor (Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)), and compelling
vaccinations during epidemics (Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)).
32. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981). Relevant to the least restrictive
means inquiry is consideration of whether exemption from regulation unduly interferes with
the accomplishment of the state's compelling interest. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,
259-60 (1982) (exempting employer from paying his share of employees' social security tax
would lead to creation of many other exemptions and make maintenance of social security
system impossible).
33. Litigants have also challenged the Act on the basis of parents' rights to provide reli-
gious education for their children and children's rights to obtain religious teaching. See State
v. Corpus Christi People's Baptist Church, Inc., 683 S.W.2d 692, 697 (Tex. 1984), appeal
dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 32, 88 L. Ed. 2d 26 (1985); People's Baptist Brief, supra note 15, at 28-29.
See generally Esbeck, supra note 2, at 33 (enumerating issues often decided by courts dealing
with state regulation of social service ministries).
34. Roloff Evangelistic Enters. v. State, 556 S.W.2d 856, 858 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 803 (1978); People's Baptist Brief, supra
note 15, at 11-13; Esbeck, supra note 2, at 1-2.
35. People's Baptist Brief, supra note 15, at 11-13; Esbeck, supra note 2, at 7-8.
36. See California Fights Churches for Control of Child Care, THE BRIEFCASE, Sept. 1985,
at 3 (Christian Law Association Newsletter); see also State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883, 887
(N.D. 1980) (pastor's testimony that seeking state approval of church school removes Christ
from position as head of Church).
37. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 43.003 (Vernon 1980).
38. Cf Bird, Freedom from Establishment and Unneutrality in Public School Instruction
and Religious School Regulation, 2 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y, 125, 194-95 (1979) (addressing
free exercise clause concerns in state accreditation of Christian school teachers).
39. See People's Baptist Brief, supra note 15, at 14-15; Esbeck, supra note 2, at 8; cf. Bird,
supra note 38, at 194-95 (teacher certification requirements can disqualify theologically quali-
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In addition to the licensing requirements of the Act, the minimum stan-
dards promulgated by the DHR also generate free exercise clause objections.
For example, the minimum standards require that children in a facility par-
ticipate in community activities. 4° Churches assert that Biblical principle,
by contrast, instructs that Christians separate to some degree from the
world.41 The minimum standards further require facilities to provide cloth-
ing to children that is comparable to community standards. 42 Some reli-
gious facilities maintain scripturally based dress codes, which are often more
strict than community dress standards. The statutory minimum standard
could require relaxation of the scripturally based dress codes; thus, the reli-
gious groups may object to the standard on free exercise grounds. Another
minimum standard prohibits facilities from requiring children to perform at
public gatherings. 43 This requirement arguably could prevent a facility from
maintaining a performing children's choir. The standards also direct facili-
ties to obtain professional treatment for children who experience trouble ad-
justing to society.44 This requirement draws objections from some religious
institutions that seek to help troubled children through religious teaching
rather than through secular, professional treatment.45
Minimum standards concerning administration of child care facilities also
draw free exercise clause objections from religious organizations. 46 The
standards require predictable operating funds and also reserve funds for a
child care facility.47 This requirement raises objections because the Bible
instructs churches to rely on God to provide finances for church
fled teachers and abridge churches' first amendment rights); Comment, Douglas v. Faith Bap-
tist Church Under Constitutional Scrutiny, 61 NEB. L. REV. 74, 82 (1982) (free exercise clause
infringement exists when parent of Christian school pupil cannot employ uncertified but theo-
logically qualified teacher due to state teacher certification requirements); Note, Government
Noninvolvement with Religious Institutions, 59 TEX. L. REV. 921, 948-49 (1981) (disqualifica-
tion of theologically qualified Christian school teachers due to state certification requirement
raises free exercise issues); Comment, State Regulation of Private Religious Schools in North
Carolina-A Model Approach, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 405, 412 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Comment, State Regulation] (teacher certification burdens religious freedom because schools
must find teachers meeting theological and state qualifications).
40. Tex. Dep't of Hum. Res., 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 83.614(0 (Shepard's Nov. 1,
1981).
41. See People's Baptist Brief, supra note 15, at 24.
42. Tex. Dep't of Hum. Res., 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 83.614(c) (Shepard's Nov. 1,
1981).
43. Id. § 83.617(h).
44. Id. § 83.613(c).
45. See People's Baptist Brief, supra note 15, at 23-24.
46. The minimum standards also require compliance with fire, health, and sanitation re-
quirements. Tex. Dep't of Hum. Res., 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 83.621-.623 (Shepard's Nov.
1, 1981). For an example of health laws that churches may find objectionable, see Comment,
State Regulation, supra note 39, at 417-18. These health laws may require, for example, pro-
viding contraceptives under the label of personal health aids. Id. Less controversial, but po-
tentially objectionable, are safety codes that have much more stringent requirements for child
care facilities than for the same facilities used for church functions on Sunday. See Esbeck,
supra note 2, at 5 n.15 (discussing Michigan case involving such safety codes).





These possible infringements by the Child Care Licensing Act address the
first prong of the test for violations of the free exercise clause. Two elements
of the compelling interest test remain, the compelling interest factor and the
least restrictive means factor. 49 The state has an interest in the safety and
health of children in child care facilities and an obligation to protect them
from physical abuse and neglect. 50 Most churches accept reasonable fire,
safety, and health standards in recognition of the state's interest in the safety
of children in child care institutions. 5' At least one religious organization
maintains that these health and safety requirements, along with existing laws
that regulate child abuse and neglect, 52 form a sufficiently comprehensive
scheme to protect the state's interest and are less restrictive than the licens-
ing scheme required by the Child Care Licensing Act.53
C. Establishment Clause Objections to the Act
The establishment clause of the first amendment prohibits the government
from making any law respecting the establishment of religion. The United
States Supreme Court has interpreted the clause to prohibit government
"sponsorship or financial support" of religion and "active involvement" of
government in religious activity. 54 The Supreme Court has developed a tri-
partite test to serve as a guideline in determining the constitutionality of
legislation under establishment clause challenge.5 5 First, the law must have
a secular purpose; second, the law's primary effect must neither inhibit nor
advance religion; finally, the law must not lead to excessive entanglement
between government and religion, especially through surveillance of reli-
gious activity by administrative agencies. 56
48. Kansas ex. rel. O'Sullivan v. Heart Ministries, Inc., 277 Kan. 244, 607 P.2d 1102,
1111, appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 802 (1980); People's Baptist Brief, supra note 15, at 24.
49. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
50. State v. Corpus Christi People's Baptist Church, Inc., 683 S.W.2d 692, 696 (Tex.
1984), appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 32, 88 L. Ed. 2d 26 (1985).
51. See Esbeck, supra note 2, at 5, 9.
52. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (child abuse/neglect); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 34.01-.06, 35.01-.03 (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1986) (reporting child abuse
and neglect).
53. See Respondent's Brief in Support of Motion for Rehearing at 10- 11, State v. Corpus
Christi People's Baptist Church, Inc., 683 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. 1984), appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct.
32, 88 L. Ed. 2d (1985) [hereinafter cited as People's Baptist Motion]; People's Baptist Brief,
supra note 15, at 33-34.
54. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
55. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). The Court's comments in Mueller v.
Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983), indicate that this test merely serves as a guideline. The Court
characterized the tripartite analysis as "'no more than [a] helpful signpost' in dealing with
Establishment Clause challenges." Id. at 394 (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741
(1973)). See also Comment, The Lemon Test Soured: The Supreme Court's New Establish-
ment Clause Analysis, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1175, 1187-98 (1984) (discussing recent cases that
Supreme Court decided on historical considerations rather than tripartite analysis).
56. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971); see Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459
U.S. 116, 123 (1982) (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 602).
The excessive entanglement prohibition entails two concerns, administrative entanglement
and political divisiveness. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 621-22; Esbeck, supra note 2, at 44. Adminis-
1986] 1055
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
The Child Care Licensing Act raises several establishment clause objec-
tions. The most frequent objection involves a claim that the Act and the
minimum standards of the DHR violate the excessive entanglement element
of the Supreme Court's tripartite test by creating an administrative relation-
ship between churches and the state. The Act authorizes the state, in addi-
tion to imposing regulatory measures on a facility, to inspect a child care
facility as often as necessary.5 7 The DHR may also inspect the records of an
institution.5" A church child care institution must report to the state many
detailed aspects of its ministry.59 Some churches believe that the scheme of
inspections and reporting subjects the child care institutions, and thus the
church, to on-going administrative surveillance and oversight.6° The
churches assert that this surveillance constitutes excessive entanglement that
is forbidden by the establishment clause.61
Although religious institutions object to the Child Care Licensing Act on
establishment clause grounds, the state has raised its own establishment
clause objection to exemption of religious facilities from the Act.62 The state
reasoned that if a court considered establishment clause objections by reli-
gious institutions and granted the institutions exemption from licensing and
regulation, then the exemption would, in effect, aid religious child care facili-
ties over nonreligious facilities. To aid religious facilities in such a manner
violates establishment clause proscriptions against aiding or advancing reli-
gion, according to the state.63
trative entanglement includes government surveillance or supervision of religious activity and
government involvement in church doctrinal disputes. See L. TRIBE, supra note 22, at 869-70;
Esbeck, supra note 37, at 382-89; Note, supra note 39, at 935. Commentators have questioned
the political entanglement factor of the entanglement test. See L. TRIBE, supra note 22, at 868-
69; Esbeck, supra note 2, at 44 n.208; Note, supra note 50, at 935 n.92. The Court appears to
have limited political entanglement considerations to cases involving direct government subsi-
dies to sectarian institutions. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403 n. 11 (1983). The polit-
ical divisiveness element reflects concerns that government involvement with a religious body
may cause popular political fragmentation along religious lines to an abnormal degree, threat-
ening normal republican processes. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622-23.
57. TEX. HUM. REs. CODE ANN. § 42.044 (Vernon 1980).
58. See, e.g., Tex. Dep't of Hum. Res., 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 83.603, .614, .624, .626
(Shepard's Nov. 1, 1981).
59. Reporting requirements include, for example, submission of an annual budget (id.
§ 83.603) and reporting biographical records of children under care (id. §§ 83.624, .626).
60. People's Baptist Brief, supra note 15, at 41-43. Note that these establishment clause
entanglement objections entail, in essence, free exercise clause claims. See, e.g., L. TRIBE,
supra note 22, at 815 ("[T]o the extent that the two clauses are understood as reinforcing one
another, doctrines developed under one are relevant to the other as well."); Durrant, Accredit-
ing Church-Related Schools: A First Amendment Analysis, 38 ARK. L. REV. 598, 626 (1985)
("While [entanglement] purports to be an establishment clause inquiry, it is equally a free
exercise clause inquiry."); Esbeck, supra note 26, at 420 (church-state entanglements threaten
the "free church"); Ripple, The Entanglement Test of the Religion Clauses-A Ten Year As-
sessment, 27 UCLA L. REV. 1195, 1214 (1980) (discussing use of entanglement concerns in the
free exercise area).
61. People's Baptist Brief, supra note 15, at 41-43.
62. See Application for Writ of Error at 7-8, State v. Corpus Christi People's Baptist





III. TREATMENT OF FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO THE CHILD
CARE LICENSING ACT BY TEXAS COURTS
Texas courts have considered some aspects of the first amendment chal-
lenges to the Child Care Licensing Act. Texas appellate courts have decided
three cases challenging the Act on first amendment grounds. 64 All of the
cases have involved child care homes operated in conjunction with the
Corpus Christi People's Baptist Church and the late Reverend Lester
Roloff.65 The courts ultimately decided each of the cases in favor of the
constitutionality of the Child Care Licensing Act and against the first
amendment contentions of the homes. 66
A. Cases Decided by the Courts of Appeals
The Texas Courts of Appeals decided two cases challenging the Child
Care Licensing Act on first amendment grounds. Both of the decisions came
from the Austin court of appeals. Each of these cases involved only free
exercise clause claims.
In Roloff Evangelistic Enterprises, Inc. v. State67 the state sought a court
order to compel the Roloff homes to obtain a license for its child care facili-
ties. At trial the state demonstrated that the Roloff organization operated a
child care facility without a license in violation of the Act. The Enterprises
asserted an affirmative defense, alleging that the Act violated its right under
the free exercise clause of the first amendment to administer the homes ac-
cording to Biblical teaching. Reverend Roloff and two other Baptist minis-
ters testified that the Bible provided the basis for operation of the homes,
that the Child Care Licensing Act conflicted with the Bible, that to allow
state control of the child care homes violated the ministers' Christian beliefs,
and that many other Christians held similar beliefs. 68 The state moved for
summary judgment, although it conceded that Reverend Roloff and his staff
64. State v. Corpus Christi People's Baptist Church, Inc., 683 S.W.2d 692, 697 (Tex.
1984), appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 32, 88 L. Ed. 2d 26 (1985); Oxford v. Hill, 558 S.W.2d 557,
561 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd); Roloff Evangelistic Enters. v. State, 556 S.W.2d
856, 859 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 803
(1978).
65. The Roloff homes serve primarily problem children, teenagers, and adults who are
sent to the home for corrective religious teaching. Corpus Christi People's Baptist Church,
Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Human Resources, 481 F. Supp. 1101, 1105 (S.D. Tex. 1979). The
Roloff Evangelistic Enterprises, Inc. owned the homes until 1979, at which time Corpus
Christi People's Baptist Church took over the ownership of the homes. Id. Lester Roloff was
president of the Roloff Enterprises and pastor of People's Baptist Church until his death in
1982. N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1982, at A16, col. 5. For a background of People's Baptist Church
and the homes, see Corpus Christi People's Baptist Church, Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Human
Resources, 481 F. Supp. at 1103-05.
66. State v. Corpus Christi People's Baptist Church, Inc., 683 S.W.2d 692, 697 (Tex.
1984), appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 32, 88 L. Ed. 2d 26 (1985); Oxford v. Hill, 558 S.W.2d 557,
561 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd); Roloff Evangelistic Enters. v. State, 556 S.W.2d
856, 859 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ refd n.r.e.), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 803
(1978).
67. 556 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.), appeal dismissed, 439
U.S. 803 (1978).
68. 556 S.W.2d at 857-58.
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operated the homes in accordance with truly held religious beliefs.69 The
trial court granted the motion and held that the Act did not violate the
convictions of Reverend Roloff.70
On appeal the Austin court of civil appeals upheld the trial court's judg-
ment.71 The court held that the Child Care Licensing Act and its require-
ments did not conflict with or infringe upon the defendant's religious
beliefs.72 The court characterized the defendant's contention that such a
conflict existed as merely conclusory and unsupported by any factual evi-
dence. 73 In support of its conclusion that no infringement existed, the court
observed that the purpose of the licensing program was only to protect the
health and well-being of children in child care facilities and that the Act
expressly forbade regulation of religious instruction.74 The court thus up-
held the Child Care Licensing Act.75
In Oxford v. Hill,76 decided shortly after Roloff, the Austin court of civil
appeals again upheld the Child Care Licensing Act against free exercise
clause claims.77 Harmon Oxford, an employee of one of the Roloff homes,
78
initiated the suit for a declaratory judgment that the Act was unconstitu-
tional. 79 The court only briefly addressed the first amendment claims. It
noted that the state had a valid interest in regulating the care of children. 80
The court again asserted that the state intended to regulate child care, not
religious instruction or inculcation of belief.81 The court held that since the
Act only regulated the conduct of child care and did not attempt to regulate
religious belief, then the Act was constitutional. 82
69. Id. at 858.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 859.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 858.
74. Id. at 858-59 (citing TEX. HUM. REs. CODE ANN. § 42.001 (Vernon 1980)).
75. 556 S.W.2d at 859.
76. 558 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ refd).
77. Id. at 561.
78. Oxford supervised one of the Roloff boys' homes. Id. at 558.
79. The doctrine of sovereign immunity prohibits suits by a citizen of a state against his
own state government unless the state consents to suit. See Oxford, 558 S.W.2d at 560. A
person may, however, sue a state official for unlawful actions. Id. The courts will refuse to
consider the unlawful acts of a state official as acts perpetrated by the state. Id. Actions taken
by state officials pursuant to an unconstitutional statute or law come within the purview of this
exception. See id. at 560-61. In Oxford, therefore, Oxford instituted the suit, albeit unsuccess-
fully, against then Attorney General of Texas, John Hill.
80. Id. at 559. The court used Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), as authority
for this proposition. Prince involved a first amendment challenge to child labor laws. A Jeho-
vah's Witness parent asserted that religious duty required her child to work despite those laws.
The Supreme Court held that the state had the power to limit parental freedom in matters
concerning a child's welfare. Id. at 167. This authority included, to some extent, the power to
limit matters of religious activity. Id. The Court refused, however, to condone every state
interference in religion done in the name of the health and welfare of children. See id. at 171.
81. Oxford, 558 S.W.2d at 558-59.
82. Id. at 559, 561.
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B. The Case Ultimately Decided by the Texas Supreme Court: State v.
Corpus Christi Baptist Church, Inc.8 3
After the unfavorable decisions at the court of appeals level, the homes
underwent several changes in preparation for the next attempt to vindicate
their first amendment claims against the Child Care Licensing Act. The
ownership of the homes shifted from the Roloff Evangelistic Enterprises to
the Corpus Christi People's Baptist Church, of which Reverend Roloff was
pastor, in order to put the State of Texas into direct conflict with a tradi-
tional church body. The homes believed that this conflict would enhance the
free exercise clause claims against the Act.84
The homes also attempted to change litigation forums. The Corpus
Christi People's Baptist Church instituted a suit in federal district court
against the DHR, requesting the court to declare the Child Care Licensing
Act unconstitutional as applied to the church and to enjoin enforcement of
the Act against the church.85 People's Baptist Church presented free exer-
cise clause claims and, unlike Roloff or Oxford, also asserted establishment
clause claims. Six days later, however, the state filed suit in a Texas state
court seeking to compel the church to comply with the Act and its require-
ments. The church then moved in the federal court to enjoin the state court
proceedings. Because of the pending state suit, the federal court dismissed
the church's action.86 Despite the dismissal the court recognized that the
case presented weighty federal constitutional questions due to the involve-
ment of a church in the action and to the newly asserted establishment
clause issues.87
In the state court action 88 the church again raised both free exercise and
establishment clause challenges to the Act. The trial court, sitting without a
jury, ruled in favor of the church, 89 and held that the Act was unconstitu-
tional as applied to the church.90 The court of appeals affirmed the trial
83. 683 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. 1984), appeal dismissed 106 S. Ct. 32, 88 L. Ed. 2d 26 (1985).
84. See 683 S.W.2d at 694. The church also retained attorney William Ball as counsel.
Attorney Ball was at that time, and still remains, prominent in first amendment religion clause
litigation. For example, he represented religious interests in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972) (successful free exercise clause challenge to compulsory school attendance), and State v.
Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750 (1976) (successful free exercise clause challenge
to state regulation of education).
85. Corpus Christi People's Baptist Church, Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Human Resources,
481 F. Supp. 1101, 1103 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
86. Id. at 1111. The court based its dismissal upon the reasoning in Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971). The abstention doctrine espoused in Younger requires federal courts to
abstain from a suit when the suit is pending in state courts. Id. at 53-54; see Corpus Christi
People's Baptist Church, Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Human Resources, 481 F. Supp. 1101, 1106
(S.D. Tex. 1979).
87. Corpus Christi People's Baptist Church, Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Human Resources,
481 F. Supp. 1101, 1105-06 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
88. State v. Corpus Christi People's Baptist Church, Inc., No. 297, 248 (Dist. Ct. of
Travis County, 200th Judicial Dist. of Texas, May 27, 1981).
89. People's Baptist Church, 683 S.W.2d at 694.
90. Id. The church had not challenged the Act as facially unconstitutional, that is uncon-
stitutional as to anyone against whom the state may enforce the Act. L. TRIBE, supra note 22,
at 710-11. If a statute is facially unconstitutional, courts will strike down the statute. Id.
People's Baptist Church only challenged the Act as it applied to their facilities. 683 S.W.2d at
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court's decision in an unpublished opinion.9 '
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and upheld the child
care licensing scheme against the first amendment challenges by People's
Baptist Church. 92 The court characterized the case as essentially the same
cause as in Roloff and Oxford with merely a change in ownership of the
homes. 93 The court, however, engaged in a more detailed analysis of the
first amendment issues than the courts in Roloff and Oxford.
The supreme court rejected the church's establishment clause argument
that the Act engendered excessive government entanglement with the
church, labeling the church's reliance on the establishment clause as mis-
placed. 94 The court noted that establishment clause analysis applies in cases
of government aid to religious organizations.95 Since the case at bar did not
concern aid to, but rather regulation of, a church ministry, the court con-
cluded that the three-prong establishment clause analysis should not apply.96
The court set forth two reasons to support its position. First, if the court
exempted churches from licensing and regulation in reliance upon the third,
excessive entanglement prong of establishment clause analysis, then the ex-
emption could violate the second prong of the test by aiding religious child
care facilities over nonexempted, nonreligious child care facilities. 97 In the
court's view, favorable treatment of religious institutions in effect aided and
advanced religion in violation of establishment clause proscriptions.
98
Second, the court distinguished establishment clause entanglement from
the entanglement created by the child care licensing scheme. 99 Under the
establishment clause, the court found that entanglement scrutiny focuses on
whether government agencies become involved with an organization in an
attempt to determine which functions of the organization are religious and
which are secular.' ° ° The agencies become involved in view of the state's
authority to aid only secular functions.' 0 ' In the court's view, since the
Child Care Licensing Act expressly prohibited regulation of religious in-
struction or curricula, the establishment clause entanglement concerns were
694. If the Church prevailed, the Act would remain in effect as to all others except People's
Baptist Church.
91. 683 S.W.2d at 694.
92. Id. at 697. Chief Justice Pope authored the opinion. No dissenting opinions were
reported.
93. Id. at 694.
94. Id. at 695.
95. Id. The court cited Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (establishment clause case
involving tax deduction for parents of parochial school children), Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971) (establishment clause case involving state aid to sectarian schools), and Walz
v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (establishment clause case concerning tax exemptions for
religious organizations) as examples of typical establishment clause cases.




100. Id. Although the Court did not cite authority, at least one commentator has noted this
proposition. See Esbeck, supra note 26, at 382-85.
101. 683 S.W.2d at 695.
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inapposite.' 0 2 The court believed that the DHR would have no need to ex-
amine and classify programs as religious or secular; thus, the agency would
not become excessively entangled with the church. 103
The court next considered the free exercise claims of People's Baptist
Church. The court found the free exercise compelling interest test to be a
more appropriate means of challenging state regulation than establishment
clause analysis."°4 Despite the appropriateness of the argument, however,
the court upheld the Child Care Licensing Act over the free exercise claims
of the church.10 5 The court apparently assumed that licensing imposed
some degree of infringement on the church's free exercise clause rights and
thus satisfied the first prong of the compelling interest test,10 6 but noted that
the church, as a corporation, voluntarily accepted a business license and
complied with business licensing requirements. 0 7 It also emphasized that
the homes were quality facilities that could easily comply with most of the
child care licensing requirements.108
The supreme court next considered whether the state had a compelling
interest in regulating child care facilities, the second prong of the test. The
court noted that children in child care institutions depend upon the institu-
tions for every aspect of care. 109 Thus, as a matter of law the court held that
the state had a compelling interest in guarding the physical and mental
safety of children who reside in child care facilities.' 10
Notwithstanding the state's compelling interest, if the child care licensing
and regulation program was not the least restrictive means of enforcing that
interest, the Act could not withstand the free exercise challenge."'I The
supreme court reasoned that, if the state exempted religious institutions from
the Act, then the state would become powerless to prevent possible abuse
and mistreatment of children in those exempted institutions." 2 The court




105. Id. at 697.
106. Id. at 694.
107. Id. People's Baptist Church attempted to distinguish corporate licensing from child
care licensing on the ground that the church would exist, albeit as an unincorporated religious
society, regardless of whether the church incorporated or not. See People's Baptist Motion,
supra note 53, at 10. Without a license the state could close the church's homes. TEx. HUM.
RES. CODE ANN. §§ 42.041, .073 (Vernon 1980). The church also argued that incorporation
did not involve extensive regulation of the church as did the child care licensing scheme. Peo-
ple's Baptist Motion, supra note 53, at 10; see also supra notes 34-48, 57-59 and accompanying
text (enumeration of regulations applied to child care facilities).
108. 683 S.W.2d at 696. The court's assertion begs the question of whether the licensing
scheme violates the church's first amendment rights.
109. Id.
110. Id. The court's holding overruled a trial court holding that the state had no compel-
ling interest in this case. See id. Possible explanations for the lower court's holding include
the excellent quality of child care provided by the homes (see id. at 694, 696), in addition to the
perceived lack of urgency on the part of the state to enforce the licensing requirements against
People's Baptist Church. See Answer to Application for Writ of Error at 9-11.
11!. See supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
112. 683 S.W.2d at 696.
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in order for the state to protect children in child care facilities., 13 Thus, the
tribunal upheld the child care licensing scheme as the least restrictive means
for enforcing that state's interest" 14 and directed the trial court to enjoin the
operation of the homes until People's Baptist Church obtained a license for
the facility." 15
Several federal courts have considered issues similar to those decided by
the Texas Supreme Court in People's Baptist Church. In Forest Hills Early
Learning Center, Inc. v. Lukhard" 16 the Fourth Circuit, on an appeal from a
summary judgment ruling, examined a provision of the Virginia child care
licensing law 117 that generally exempted religious child care facilities from
licensing and compliance with some child care regulations. The Virginia law
required religious child care facilities to register with the state and to comply
with fire, health, and safety regulations.' 18 The state could close a facility
that failed to comply with regulations. 119 Forest Hills Early Learning
Center, Inc. challenged this statutory exemption as unconstitutionally ad-
vancing religion.
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that since the Virginia law exempted only
sectarian facilities from many areas of child care regulation, then the exemp-
tion aided and advanced religious child care facilities over secular child care
institutions. 20 The court noted, however, that religious child care facilities
should receive an exemption to the extent that the licensing requirements
and regulations impermissibly infringed upon the institutions' free exercise
clause right as measured by the compelling interest test. 12 1 The Fourth Cir-
cuit, like the Texas Supreme Court in People's Baptist Church, considered
free exercise clause analysis, rather than establishment clause analysis, to be
the proper inquiry in justifying exemption of religious institutions from gov-
ernment regulation. ' 22 Since no religious child care institutions were parties
in the case and only a meager factual record existed, the Fourth Circuit did
not reach a decision on the free exercise clause concerns. 123 The court
viewed religious child care institutions as the most appropriate litigants to
113. Id.; see also Kansas ex. rel. O'Sullivan v. Heart Ministries, Inc., 227 Kan. 244, 607
P.2d 1102, 1111-12, appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 802 (1980) (court reasoned that without licens-
ing state lacks knowledge essential to performance of its duty to protect children in child care
facilities).
114. 683 S.W.2d at 696. The court did not discuss other alternatives to licensing that it
may have considered in reaching its conclusion.
115. Id. at 697. The court also considered other challenges asserted by the defendants
against the Act, including parental rights to provide religious education for their children and
children's rights to obtain religious teaching. Id.; see supra note 33. The court summarily
rejected these claims. 683 S.W.2d at 697.
116. 728 F.2d 230 (4th Cir. 1984).
117. VA. CODE §§ 63.1-196.3 (1980).
118. Id.; Forest Hills, 728 F.2d at 235-39; Esbeck, supra note 2, at 27-30.
119. VA. CODE §§ 63.1-196.3 (1980); Forest Hills, 728 F.2d at 236; Esbeck, supra note 2, at
30.
120. Forest Hills, 728 F.2d at 241-42.
121. Id. at 241. For the elements of the compelling interest test, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 27-32.
122. Forest Hills, 728 F.2d at 238 n.6.
123. See id. at 245-47.
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assert the free exercise clause rights that might justify the Virginia statutory
exemption. 124
Other cases at the federal level have involved establishment clause chal-
lenges to regulation of church ministries. Unlike in the People's Baptist
Church case, however, the courts in these cases have accepted establishment
clause challenges to regulation of religious child care facilities, even though
the cases did not involve outright government assistance to religious organi-
zations. In NLRB v. Catholic Bishop1 25 the United States Supreme Court
used establishment clause entanglement analysis in refusing to extend NLRB
jurisdiction to church-operated schools. 126 The NLRB had asserted juris-
diction over labor and collective bargaining aspects of the schools involved
in the case. The Supreme Court found that the NLRB, by asserting jurisdic-
tion, could become involved in labor decisions of the schools and thus in-
fringe upon the management of the schools. 127 The Court characterized the
action as church-state entanglement that contravenes first amendment pro-
tections.1 28 Since NLRB jurisdiction over the schools presented a risk of
first amendment infringement, and since Congress had not clearly provided
the NLRB with authority over church-operated schools, the Supreme Court
declined to construe the National Labor Relations Act to give the NLRB
authority over the schools. 129 The Supreme Court, unlike the Texas
Supreme Court in People's Baptist Church, thus applied excessive entangle-
ment criteria, an establishment clause test, in a case that seemed to involve
only free exercise clause issues raised by intrusive government regulations.
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit addressed exces-
sive entanglement concerns in Surinach v. Pesquera de Busquets.130 The
Surinach court examined an information-gathering and inspection pro-
gram13 1 imposed by Puerto Rico on Catholic Church schools. The First
Circuit noted that the program required the schools to supply detailed infor-
mation to the government and that the program involved on-going govern-
mental surveillance and oversight of the ministry to ensure compliance with
program regulations.1 32 The court concluded that the program excessively
entangled the church and state. 133 Unlike the court in People's Baptist
Church, the Surinach court reached its conclusion even though the entangle-
ment did not involve the state in classifying aspects of school programs as
religious or secular, which is essential to the traditional entanglement in-
124. Id. The Fourth Circuit remanded the case to give religious child care institutions that
would suffer from termination of the exemption a chance to intervene in the case. Id. The
court noted that the religious institutions would need to demonstrate free exercise clause rights
entitled to state accommodation in order to save the statutory exemption. Id. The case is still
pending.
125. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
126. Id. at 507.
127. Id. at 502-04.
128. Id. at 503.
129. Id. at 507.
130. 604 F.2d 73 (lst Cir. 1979).
131. P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 3, §§ 341a-341v (1982).
132. Surinach, 604 F.2d at 78.
133. Id. at 78-79.
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quiry. 13 4 The government could not justify the regulatory program since it
failed to prove that a compelling governmental interest existed and that the
program was the least restrictive means of enforcing that interest.13 5 The
Surinach court thus utilized excessive entanglement concerns to analyze the
infringement element of the free exercise clause compelling interest test.1 36
Thus, both Catholic Bishop and Surinach applied excessive entanglement
concerns as part of the infringement element of the free exercise clause
test. 13 7 The Texas Supreme Court, on the other hand, held in People's Bap-
tist Church that excessive entanglement concerns should not apply unless the
state participates in identifying or classifying aspects of church ministries as
secular or religious. Because the Texas Supreme Court assumed that an in-
fringement existed, however, it applied the second and third elements of the
compelling interest test.' 38 Thus, all three courts relied primarily upon the
compelling interest analysis of the free exercise clause, but disagreed upon
the applicability of excessive entanglement concerns. The Texas Supreme
Court's analysis is, therefore, generally in accord with federal court analysis,
but its holding conflicts with the federal court decisions, which upheld first
amendment challenges to government regulatory programs.
IV. THE STATUS OF THE LAW IN TEXAS
The law concerning the constitutionality of the child care licensing
scheme in Texas has slowly progressed over the last decade. First, the Roloff
court held that the Child Care Licensing Act did not infringe upon the first
amendment rights of religious child care institutions. 139 Next, the court in
Oxford moved the law a step beyond infringement considerations, but ap-
plied the wrong free exercise clause test to the Child Care Licensing Act.
The Oxford court upheld the Act since it regulated conduct but not religious
belief. 4° That the state may regulate conduct is, to some degree, true.' 4'
Nevertheless, long before Oxford the United States Supreme Court had
moved away from the conduct-belief dichotomy to the more realistic three-
tier compelling interest test. 142 Under the compelling interest test a state
may not justify a regulation by claiming that it merely regulates conduct.
The Constitution permits only those infringements on religion that are the
least restrictive means of enforcing a compelling state interest.'43
Finally, the law in Texas progressed another step when the constitutional-
ity of the Child Care Licensing Act reached the Texas Supreme Court in
134. Id.
135. Id. at 79-80.
136. See also Bangor Baptist Church v. Maine, 549 F. Supp. 1208, 1220-22 (D. Me. 1982)
(incorporating excessive entanglement considerations into free exercise analysis).
137. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 502-07; Surinach, 604 F.2d at 78-80.
138. 683 S.W.2d at 694-96.
139. 556 S.W.2d at 858-59. The court's ruling in Roloff may have partially resulted from
an inadequate factual record at trial. See Esbeck, supra note 2, at 13.
140. 558 S.W.2d at 558-61.
141. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
142. Id. at 403-07.
143. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).
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People's Baptist Church. Despite questionable rejection of establishment
clause claims,'" the supreme court applied the correct free exercise clause
test, the compelling state interest test. Unfortunately, the court's compelling
interest analysis failed to examine whether child care licensing constituted
the least restrictive means of enforcing the state's compelling interest in child
care. The court stated that without licensing the state could not gather in-
formation necessary to protect children in child care homes and would be-
come powerless to prevent mistreatment of children. 145 Noticeably, the
court failed to mention any alternatives to licensing that it may have consid-
ered in arriving at its conclusion that licensing is the least restrictive manner
of enforcing the state's interest. Commentators have suggested that alterna-
tives exist. 146
If, as the court suggested, information constitutes a major state concern,
then the state should develop a registration scheme. Under a registration
scheme church child care institutions register with the state and supply the
state with necessary information, such as the facility's location and staff-
child ratio. 147 The state would receive the information, but would not issue
a license, which suggests that the church ministry exists only at the pleasure
of the state. 148 Registration would thus allay churches' fears that the licens-
ing requirement sets the state supreme over God.
Moreover, in the absence of a licensing scheme the state would not be-
come powerless to stop mistreatment of children. Fire, health, and sanita-
tion codes already exert some control over religious child care facilities. 
149
The state could develop a scheme whereby religious institutions supply evi-
dence of compliance with the codes to the DHR.150 Child abuse and neglect
laws also exist as further controls upon religious child care institutions.15
The state could put other major concerns, such as maintenance of adequate
staff-child ratios and restrictions on employment of former drug addicts or
sex offenders, into statutory form like child abuse and neglect laws. Such a
course of action would act to insure the safety, health, and welfare of chil-
dren in child care institutions. 152 The scheme insures that the major con-
144. See supra text accompanying notes 137-38.
145. 683 S.W.2d at 696.
146. See Baron, Licensing: The Myth of Government Protection, 8 BARRISTER, Winter
1981, at 46, 49-50 (suggesting replacement of most licensing with enforcement system in which
states codify standards of conduct so that state officials concentrate on punishment of wrong-
doers rather than expending time on those who comply with law); Esbeck, supra note 26, at
413-14 & n.399 (listing several states that have adopted nonlicensing child welfare schemes);
Esbeck, supra note 2, at 53-56 (suggesting registration scheme that enforces major state con-
cerns without licensing).
147. Esbeck, supra note 2, at 27-30 (discussing child care registration programs in Ala-
bama, Indiana, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Virginia).
148. Id. at 32.
149. See Esbeck, supra note 2, at 5, 9.
150. See Esbeck, supra note 2, at 54.
151. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04 (Vernon Supp. 1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§§ 34.01-.06, 35.01-.03 (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1986).
152. In order to implement the suggested scheme, the state might exempt religious child
care institutions from the Child Care Licensing Act and place the institutions under the regis-
tration and enforcement scheme suggested. Exemption, however, is suspect due to establish-
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cerns of the current licensing scheme will remain protected without
unnecessarily infringing upon the beliefs of religious child care institutions.
Furthermore, a registration and enforcement scheme like that suggested may
not compromise the actual safety of children in child care facilities since, as
one commentator suggests, licensing does not guarantee continuous compli-
ance with regulatory standards. 5 3 The state discovers noncompliance only
during an investigation; a license does not guarantee compliance with regula-
tory standards in the absence of investigators. 154
Licensing, therefore, is probably not the least restrictive means of enforc-
ing the state's interest in child care. Thus, the Texas Supreme Court's free
exercise clause analysis in People's Baptist Church is questionable. The pro-
gression in the analysis of first amendment issues raised by child care licens-
ing has, however, stopped with the ruling that licensing is the least
restrictive enforcement means. Perhaps the law will eventually progress to a
thorough reconsideration of the least restrictive means element of the com-
pelling interest test.
ment clause concerns raised in Forest Hills, 728 F.2d at 241-42. The state should, therefore,
consider placing all child care facilities, religious and nonreligious, under a registration and
enforcement scheme.
153. Baron, supra note 146, at 48-50.
154. Id.
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